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 Concussion and Concussion Management in the NFL: 
Pathophysiology and Economics 
Steven Broglio* and Rodney Fort** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This is a paper about concussions and the management of concus-
sions (we’ll use concussions/management) using the National Football 
League (NFL) as an object lesson.  Because concussions/management 
has become such a heated policy topic, our approach is to set emotion 
aside and go back to the very basic issues.  We begin with the clinical 
understanding of concussions/management.  Then we overview the 
NFL and offer the informed opinion that the concus-
sions/management problem in the NFL is worse than it would be if 
the talent market were (1) fully informed on both sides of the bargain-
ing table, (2) absent barriers to sincere bargaining, and (3) able to ef-
fectively enforce bargains that actually do get made.  We hope that 
rather than demonizing either concussions or the NFL, our presenta-
tion instead helps to inform the concussion policy community as it 
moves forward in dealing with this problem. 
We do not mean to downplay the occurrence of concussions in 
any other walk of life, but our expertise lies in athletic medicine and 
sports economics, so sports it is.  We also do not mean to downplay 
concussions in other sports.  Indeed, based on the number of partici-
pants nationwide, other sports no doubt have a larger number of con-
cussions with which to deal.  We hope the virtues of focusing on the 
NFL are apparent as we go through it.  For example, there is a massive 
set of lawsuits currently pending against the NFL for its past behavior 
regarding information about the long-term impacts of concussions on 
players and, as a result, the management of concussions by the NFL.  
In August 2012, University of Massachusetts sports law professor 
Glenn Wong documents the number of lawsuits and puts the potential 
total amount at $10 billion, based on a $500,000 average award and his 
estimate of the total number of former players that might sue at 132 
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cases with 3,402 litigants1 (the number has, of course, grown since 
Wong’s writing). 
The paper goes as follows.  Section II provides the state-of-the-art 
clinical understanding of concussions/management as a quality of life 
issue, essential to an informed concussion policy discussion.  Section 
III goes through our argument that the level of concussions in the 
NFL is high because of information dissemination limitations, barriers 
to sincere bargaining, and enforcement limitations. Conclusions round 
out the paper in Section IV. 
II.  CONCUSSIONS AND CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT (BEST 
PRACTICES) 
A. Concussion Incidence 
Sport concussion has become a significant public health concern 
over the previous decade.  Different from other injuries, concussions 
often do not have outwardly visible signs and symptoms, prompting 
the Centers for Disease Control to label the injury as a “silent epi-
demic.”2  Historical estimates of concussion incidence estimated 
300,000 cases occurred in a given year.3  The true injury incidence is 
likely higher, as 53% of concussed high school athletes are suspected 
of not reporting their injury to medical personnel, coaches, or parents,4 
and collegiate athletes are thought to hide their injuries at even 
greater rates (80%).5  The reasons for under-reporting concussions at 
both levels are not entirely clear, although not wanting to let the team 
down, being perceived as weak, and the ‘warrior’ culture of the sport 
have all been cited.6  With a better understanding of the substantial 
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 1 Glenn M. Wong, SN Concussion Report: NFL Could Lose Billions in Player Lawsuits, 
SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 22, 2012), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-08-22/nfl-
concussion-lawsuits-money-bankrupt-players-sue-head-injuries. 
 2 MARK FAUL ET AL., U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS, 
HOSPITALIZATIONS, AND DEATHS 2002-2006 5 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
traumaticbraininjury/pdf/blue_book.pdf. 
 3 Press Release, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sports-Associated Re-
current Brain Injuries - United States (Mar. 1997), http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/braini1.htm. 
 4 Michael McCrea et al., Unreported Concussion in High School Football Players: Implica-
tions for Prevention, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 13 (2004). 
 5 JoEllen M. Sefton et al., An Examination of Factors That Influence Knowledge and 
Reporting of Mild Brain Injuries in Collegiate Football, 39 J. ATHL. TRAIN. S52 (2004). 
 6 See McCrea, supra note 4.  
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number of injuries that go unreported and undiagnosed, more recent 
injury estimates approach four million each year as a result of sport 
and physical activity.7  
Concussion incidence varies by activity, with contact- and colli-
sion-sport athletes at the highest risk.  Among collegiate sports moni-
tored by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the 
risk for concussion is lowest among volleyball players at 0.15 per 1000 
athlete-exposures (AE) during games.  Injury rates climb with more 
aggressive sports having higher injury rates: men’s lacrosse 
(1.08/1000AE), men’s ice hockey (1.47/1000AE), and football 
(2.34/1000AE).  As this discussion will address concussions resulting 
from football participation, it is important to note that the injury inci-
dence is consistent across all levels of play.  Concussive injuries occur-
ring during college level play are reported to range from 4.8% to 
6.3% of athletes per year8 while 7.7% of NFL athletes9 are concussed 
on an annual basis.  This accounts for 3,264 to 4,284 of the 38,000 col-
legiate players and 130 of the 1,700 NFL athletes each year.  High 
school athletes sustain concussions at the same rate, 3.6% to 5.6% 
annually,10 but among the 1.2 million players taking the field each year, 
43,200 to 67,200 will be concussed. 
Despite the similarities in team concussion incidence across dif-
fering levels of play, there are distinct injury risks among different 
player positions.  Among professional football athletes, the incidence 
of concussion for every 100 team games is highest among tight ends 
(1.45), followed by quarterbacks (1.20), wide receivers (0.91), defen-
sive secondary (0.93), running backs (0.86), linebackers (0.61), punt 
returner (0.45), and the offensive and defensive linemen (0.28 and 
0.26).11 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Jean A. Langlois et al., The Epidemiology and Impact of Traumatic Brain Injury: A Brief 
Overview, 21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABILITATION 375 (2006). 
 8 Kevin M. Guskiewicz, Epidemiology of Concussion in Collegiate and High School Foot-
ball Players, 28 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 643, 646 (2000); see Michael McCrea et al., Cumulative Ef-
fects Associated With Recurrent Concussion in Collegiate Football Players: The NCAA Concus-
sion Study, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2549 (2003).  
 9 See E.J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Epidemiological Features of 
Game Injuries and Review of the Literature, Part 3, 54 NEUROSURGERY 81 (2004).  
 10 See John W. Powell & Kim D. Barber-Foss, Traumatic Brian Injury in High School Ath-
letes, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 958 (1999); see Guskiewicz, supra note 8.  
 11 Ira R. Casson, Twelve Years of National Football League Concussion Data, 2 SPORTS 
HEALTH 471 (2010). 
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B. Concussion Pathophysiology 
The term concussion comes from the Latin concutere, meaning to 
shake violently12 and is the clinical presentation of a mild traumatic 
brain injury (TBI).  Contrary to popular notion, during a typical sport 
concussion, the brain is not contused by striking the inner surface of 
the cranium.  Indeed, there is no macroscopic physical change in brain 
structure resulting from this injury; rather, there is a change in brain 
functionality.  The rapid acceleration or deceleration of the brain 
brought on by an external biomechanical force13 results in the uncon-
trolled depolarization of neurons.14  The ions that normally pass across 
the neuronal membrane to generate the electrical activity of the brain 
are displaced on the order of 400-500 times their normal concentra-
tion.  This shift is coupled with a simultaneous decrease in cerebral 
blood flow15 that inhibits the availability of energy (i.e., glucose) to the 
injured tissue.  The brain immediately begins to restore homeostasis, 
but the exact duration of the process cannot be predicted. 
While concussion is thought to be the clinical presentation of a 
mild TBI, athletes regularly sustain multiple “sub-concussive” head 
impacts that do not result in a clinical injury presentation.  Despite the 
lack of clinical findings, some degree of injury has likely been sus-
tained as preliminary evidence suggests that sub-concussive impacts 
are associated with cortical dysfunction that is not clinically apparent.16  
In either scenario, concussive and sub-concussive impacts are now 
being linked to pathophysiologic mechanisms, such as the accumula-
tion of tau protein.17 
C. Acute Signs and Symptoms 
In the immediate aftermath of a concussion, athletes are known 
to report a number of symptoms to medical professionals.  Headache 
is by far the most commonly reported with 83% of concussed athletes 
indicating its presence.  Other symptoms are prevalent but less fre-
quent, such as dizziness (65% of concussed athletes) and confusion 
                                                                                                                           
 12 John Pearce, Observations on Concussion: A Review, 59 EUR. NEUROLOGY 113 (2008).  
 13 See P. McCrory et al., Consensus Statement on Concussion in Sport 3rd International 
Conference on Concussion in Sport Held in Zurich, 43 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. i76 (2009). 
 14 Christopher C. Giza & David A. Hovda, The Neurometabolic Cascade of Concussion, 36 
J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 228 (2001). 
 15 Id. 
 16 T.M. Talvage, Functionally-Detected Cognitive Impairment in High School Football Play-
ers Without Clinically-Diagnosed Concussion, J. NEUROTRAUMA (forthcoming). 
 17 Brandon E. Gavett et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: A Potential Late Effect of 
Sport-Related Concussive and Subconcussive Head Trauma, 30 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 179 
(2011).  
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(57% of concussed athletes).18  Notably, loss of consciousness is ob-
served in fewer than 10% of all injuries,19 and outcomes following in-
jury do not appear to be tied to the presence or absence of on-field 
loss of consciousness.20  Other symptoms, such as post-traumatic amne-
sia, appear to provide greater sensitivity to injury severity with longer 
spans of amnesia indicative of longer recovery times.21  
In addition to athlete reported symptoms, there are also notable 
changes to cognitive functioning (e.g., reaction time and memory) and 
motor control (e.g., balance and gait).22  How and which deficits vary 
widely between athletes, but the majority of athletes (80-90%) will 
demonstrate a spontaneous resolution and return to pre-injury levels 
of functioning within seven to ten days following the injury.23  
D. Persistent Effects of Concussion 
A significant amount of research over the previous twenty years 
has been dedicated to elucidating concussion’s acute effects and reso-
lution.  In the previous decade however, there has been an increased 
interest in how the injury may affect long-term cognitive health.  The 
notion that repeated concussive and sub-concussive blows to the head 
lead to persistent effects is not a novel theory.  In 1928, Martland first 
described tremors, slowed movement, confusion, and speech abnor-
malities in a group of boxers.  The condition was labeled “Punch 
Drunk.”24  
At that time, the physiological underpinnings of the condition 
were not evident, but more recent research has reported similar clini-
cal findings in former professional football athletes and the disease 
has been termed Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE).  The 
clinical presentation of CTE is one of disordered cognition, memory 
loss and executive dysfunction, depression, apathy, disinhibition, and 
irritability, as well as Parkinsonian signs that appear in midlife, years 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Guskiewicz, supra note 8, at 647; P.R. McCrory et al, The Nature and Duration of 
Acute Concussive Symptoms in Australian Football, 10 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 235 (2000); J. 
Scott Delaney et al., Concussions Among University Football and Soccer Players, 12 CLINICAL J. 
SPORTS MED. 331 (2002).  
 19 Delaney, supra note 18; Guskiewicz, supra note 8.  
 20 M.R. Lovell et al., Does Loss of Consciousness Predict Neuropsychological Decrements 
After Concussion?, 9 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 193 (1999).  
 21 M.W. Collins et al., On-Field Predictors of Neuropsychological and Symptom Deficit 
Following Sports-Related Concussion, 13 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 222 (2003); David Erlanger et 
al., Symptom-Based Assessment of the Severity of a Concussion, 98 J. NEUROSURGERY 477 
(2003).  
 22 Steven Broglio et al., The Effect of Sport Concussion on Neurocognitive Function, Self-
Report Symptoms, and Postural Control: A Meta-Analysis, 38 SPORTS MED. 53 (2008). 
 23 McCrory, supra note 13. 
 24 Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103 (1928). 
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after sports participation has ended.25  The exact structural and chemi-
cal changes that cause the disease are not clear, but as mentioned 
above, both concussive and sub-concussive impacts may be associated 
with tau protein deposition.26  Animal (i.e., mouse) research has also 
demonstrated hippocampal cell death within three days of a concus-
sion27 while in humans, pyramidal neuron atrophy and neuronal cell 
death in regions of the hippocampus are seen following traumatic 
brain injury.28  
The typical aging process is also tightly linked to pyramidal cell 
structure declines.29  This has led some to speculate that both normal 
cerebral aging combined with repeated exposure to external forces 
may accelerate cognitive decline in some people.30  The exact number 
of concussive and/or sub-concussive impacts necessary to trigger later-
life cognitive dysfunction is not known, but it is known that the aver-
age high school football athlete sustains 652 impacts across a season, 
while some athletes will receive over 2,200.31  At the college level, the 
median number of impacts is 420 in a season, with a maximum of 
2,500.32  Research of this type has not been completed at the profes-
sional level. 
The magnitude of cognitive change in later life following re-
peated head impacts remains in question.  Anecdotal findings suggest 
that many athletes with a limited number of injuries have continued 
on to be high functioning adults while others are at risk for earlier and 
more severe cognitive declines.  If the relationship between head im-
pacts and later life cognitive declines proves to be true, then the dis-
ease risk is likely a dose response.  That is, the high school athlete that 
plays two or three years will be at less risk for cognitive decline than 
the collegiate athlete that plays an additional two to three years or the 
athlete that plays two to three years at the professional level.  It is im-
portant to note however, that the relationship between changes in 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Gavett, supra note 17, at 185.   
 26 Id. at 182. 
 27 V. Tashlykov et al., Apoptotic Changes in the Cortex and Hippocampus Following Mini-
mal Brain Trauma in Mice, 1130 BRAIN RES. 197, 203 (2007).  
 28 W.L. Maxwell et al., There is Differential Loss of Pyramidal Cells From the Human 
Hippocampus with Survival After Blunt Head Injury, 62 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & 
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 272 (2003).  
 29 See A. Peters, Structural Changes that Occur During Normal Aging of Primate Cerebral 
Hemispheres, 26 NEUROSCI. BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 733 (2002). 
 30 Steven Broglio et al., Cognitive Decline and Aging: The Role of Concussive and Sub-
Concussive Impacts, 40 EXERCISE & SPORT SCI. REV. 138 (2012).  
 31 Steven Broglio et al., Cumulative Head Impact Burden in High School Football, 28 J. 
NEUROTRAMA 2069, 2071 (2011).  
 32 Joseph J. Crisco et al., Head Impact Exposure in Collegiate Football Players, 44 J. 
BIOMECHANICS. 2673, 2674-77 (2011). 
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metabolic and ionic function following a head impact and long term 
pathological changes to the cerebral tissue is not fully understood.  
Head impact exposure is only one determinant, as intrinsic and extrin-
sic factors (e.g., genetics, excessive alcohol intake, smoking, sedentary 
lifestyle) can also negatively influence long term brain physiology.33 
E. Best Practices 
Defining best injury-management practices for clinicians to fol-
low when evaluating and treating concussed athletes is difficult, given 
the rapidly changing state of the science.  In addition, concussion 
evaluation in the context of sport, where decisions often need to be 
made in a few minutes or less, places additional burden on the clini-
cian.  That being said, there are some approaches to injury manage-
ment that are grounded in sound research and widely adopted. 
In all instances, clinicians should evaluate their athletes at high 
risk for concussion prior to the competitive season.  The intent of this 
assessment is to record pre-injury/baseline information on their ath-
letes that can be used for post-mortem comparison.  During the sea-
son, the clinical management of a concussion can be broken into two 
distinct but equally important sections.  The first addresses the imme-
diate evaluation and injury diagnosis while the second is directed at 
the recovery and return-to-play process.     
When an athlete sustains an impact suspected of causing a con-
cussion, he/she should be removed from play and evaluated by a 
medical professional with specific concussion training.  The post-injury 
evaluation should include a thorough clinical exam that encompasses 
symptoms and is supported by objective measures of motor control 
and mental status.34  In the event the athlete is diagnosed with a con-
cussion, he/she should not be allowed to return to sport for the re-
mainder of the day. 
Following a concussion diagnosis, the athlete should be moni-
tored on a daily basis for the presence of concussion-related symp-
toms.  In cases where symptoms worsen within the first forty-eight 
hours or do not resolve in a normal time course, referral to a concus-
sion specialist should be considered.  Once symptoms associated with 
the injury resolve, the athlete should complete a neurocognitive and 
motor control examination identical to the one completed prior to the 
                                                                                                                           
 33 T. Etgen et al., Mild Cognitive Impairment and Dementia: The Importance of Modifiable 
Risk Factors, 108 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT INT’L. 743, 747-48 (2011); Edward McAuley et al., 
Cardiovascular Fitness and Neurocognitive Function in Older Adults: A Brief Review, 18 BRAIN, 
BEHAVIOR, & IMMUNITY 214, 217 (2004).  
 34 Steven Broglio et al., Sensitivity of the Concussion Assessment Battery, 60 
NEUROSURGERY 1050 (2007).  
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season.  If these tests show a return to pre-injury levels of functioning, 
a return-to-play progression can be considered.35  Following the pro-
gression, a medical professional should clear the athlete to return to 
full sport activity.  As of this writing, forty-one states require the ap-
proval of a licensed medical practitioner for this final step.  For exam-
ple, the Zackery Lystedt Law in the state of Washington was the first 
after a junior high school football player suffered brain damage after 
returning to the game in 2006 following a concussion.36  
Previous recommendations using firm guidelines for return to 
play37 are not prudent, as each injury should be managed on an indi-
vidual basis.  Under most circumstances, a concussed athlete will likely 
miss eleven days of full sport participation: seven days injury recovery 
and four days during the return-to-play progression.  This timeline, 
however, is variable based on individual injury circumstances and the 
clinical judgment of the medical personnel. 
III. CONCUSSIONS/MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE NFL 
We preface everything in this section with the obvious: this is a 
workplace safety issue and, as such, it is well understood in the eco-
nomics literature and examples are abundant.  Thus, everything that 
follows is distilled to the case of the NFL from a broad treatment over 
a long period of time.  There have always been, and continue to be, 
dangerous workplace environments both in and out of sports. 
Even this most basic observation offers something to the concus-
sion policy community that is vital but overlooked—there is value to 
both sides (owners and players) in correctly handling the issue.  Con-
cussions, poorly managed, reduce player value to owners and to play-
ers themselves.  That this might be true only in the “expected value” 
sense (not all athletes will suffer concussion for example) does not 
reduce the power of this initial insight. 
For 2012, spotrac.com reports that top-ten quarterback salaries 
range from $5.5 million (Matt Hasselbeck, Tennessee Titans) to $18 
million (Peyton Manning, Denver Broncos).  Top-ten wide receiver 
pay ranges from $5 million (Larry Fitzgerald, Arizona Cardinals) to 
$11 million (Vincent Jackson, Tampa Bay Buccaneers).  Players clearly 
have millions on the line with every possible concussion that may oc-
                                                                                                                           
 35 McCrory, supra note 13.  
 36 NFL Urging States to Pass Youth Football Concussion Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 
23, 2011), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81e710d9/article/nfl-urging-states-to-pass-
youth-football-concussion-laws.  
 37 Robert C. Cantu, Posttraumatic Retrograde and Anterograde Amnesia: Pathophysiology 
and Implications in Grading and Safe Return to Play, 36 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 244, 246-47 
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cur.  While the data in the last section suggest that wide receivers 
might be at the bottom of the relative scale of concussion incidence, 
they are extremely valuable economically in terms of the revenue they 
generate from fans. 
However, it is well known among sports economists that the 
revenues actually generated for owners are in excess of salary pay-
ments to players, especially for younger high-performers.38  In addition, 
it is the production process involving the players that contributes the 
rest of the value captured by owners.  So, just as clear as it is to players, 
owners have millions in revenue on the line, over and above the part 
they must pay players, with every possible concussion as well. 
Despite this powerful initial insight, there is every reason to be-
lieve that the number of concussions is larger than would occur, and 
the management of concussions is less effective than would occur, if 
the NFL talent market were (1) fully informed on both sides of the 
market, (2) absent barriers to sincere bargaining, and (3) able to effec-
tively enforce bargains that actually do get made.  We address these, 
seriatim. 
A. Information Dissemination Limitations 
How close does the talent market come to providing full and 
complete information of the actual state of knowledge about concus-
sions/management to both owners and players?  If the talent market 
performed perfectly on this dimension, scientific advances would be 
common knowledge instantly.  In the case of the NFL, the answer is 
that the talent market has not accomplished this very well in the past.  
We detail that outcome not to demonize the NFL but to point out that 
information is key and its dissemination a matter of policy concern.  
While we both observed these results as observers of the sports scene, 
we also borrow from the exemplary overview by Joseph Hanna and 
Daniel Kain.39 
Despite the growing clinical evidence, the NFL Concussion 
Committee denied a link between concussions and cognition starting 
in 2005.  This is especially troubling since there was not a single neu-
ropathologist on the committee.  The evidence continued to grow.  
Autopsy studies claimed that Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy 
(CTE) triggered by multiple concussions partially explained the 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Gerald W. Scully, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 
915 (1974).   
 39 Joseph M. Hanna, Concussions May Prove to Be A Major Headache for the NFL Players’ 
Class Action Suit Places A Bounty on the League, 84-OCT. N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (2012).   
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deaths of former NFL players.  The Concussion Committee down-
played these claims on the basis of such a small sample.  When the 
sample grew to a survey and analysis of 2,550 former NFL athletes 
supporting the relationship between concussions and MCI and de-
pression, the Concussion Committee responded that surveys of this 
nature were unreliable. 
As the evidence continued to mount, the Concussion Committee 
convened a concussion summit in 2007.  Crucial to our observation 
about the lack of information dissemination, the NFL Players Associa-
tion (NFLPA) had been left out entirely to this point but was finally 
represented at the summit.  The Concussion Committee acknowl-
edged that concussions were an issue but still issued no policy recom-
mendations.  The body of evidence from more autopsy studies grew, 
but the Concussion Committee stuck to its earlier “small sample” 
guns. 
Eventually, the evidence became overwhelming and, in 2009, the 
NFL finally acted.  No doubt, the 2009 autopsy evidence that then 
current NFL player Chris Henry had CTE took the wind out of the 
NFL’s sails.  The owner members of the league replaced the leadership 
on the Concussion Committee and added neurologists.  The league 
also admitted that the medical research clearly showed that concus-
sions lead to long-term health problems and put an independent (not 
hired by the team owners) doctor in charge of concussion evaluation 
on the field.  There were also changes on the field of play.  For the 
2009 season, blocking rules were changed to prohibit hits below the 
knees and in the back, additional behavior against defenseless receiv-
ers was identified that would now be penalized, and formation block-
ing on kickoffs was outlawed.   
The league worked with the NFLPA and issued their strong 
warning of June 2010: 
[T]raumatic brain injury can cause a wide range of short- or long-
term changes affecting thinking, sensation, language, or emotions.  
These changes may lead to problems with memory and commu-
nication, personality changes, as well as depression and the early 
onset of dementia.  Concussions and conditions resulting from re-
peated brain injury can change your life and your family’s life 
forever.
 40 
Following the announcement, for the 2010 season, the league be-
gan imposing fines and playing time reductions on illegal hits, espe-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. at 17 (citing Press Release, National Football League, Concussion: A Must Read for 
NFL Players (July 26, 2010) (emphasis added)). 
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cially helmet-to-helmet and head and neck.  For the 2012 season, 
harkening back to the data on the rate of injuries on special teams in 
Section II, kickoffs are now shorter by five yards.  But there remained 
disagreement among consulting neurologists to the NFL about how 
widespread the problem is for current players (not past players) since 
there is only Chris Henry’s autopsy to go on.  But even this disagree-
ment withered in the face of recent suicides of retired players Ray 
Easterling (ret. 1979) and Dave Duerson (ret. 1993).  
This past behavior by NFL owners toward concus-
sions/management information, essentially “hiding” it from scrutiny 
by continued non-scientific refutation and denial, clearly shows that 
the talent market was not allowed to perform its essential function.  
However, it should not be lost on the concussion policy community 
that eventually the information was forthcoming and real changes 
have taken place on and off the field. 
Contact rules for quarterbacks and wide receivers are the most 
notable to fans, but there was also the response toward on-field con-
cussion assessment.  While not all-encompassing in terms of the best 
practices listed in Section II, it was a move in that direction.  If the 
doctor’s opinion is that a player is exhibiting concussion symptoms, 
the player must leave the game and receive an immediate assessment.  
Failure to pass that subsequent assessment means the player cannot 
return to that game.  While some in the concussion policy community 
decry the late arrival, they did at least arrive. 
As for the future, the NFL is making attempts to send the mes-
sage down the line.  Through the Commissioner’s office, the NFL 
owners are calling for the remaining states to follow the example of 
the other forty-one (with three more pending) and enact youth foot-
ball concussion laws that follow the best practices in Section II.  Sum-
ming it up nicely, long-time critic Congresswoman Linda Sanchez 
(California) offered this sideways compliment, “While it heartens me 
to see that the NFL’s finally embraced the growing body of scientific 
evidence that points to major problems for people who suffer multiple 
concussions, it’s been a long time coming.” 
As for the basic economic insight concerning workplace safety, 
there is a bit of a conundrum here.  Since concussions/management 
information is also valuable to players, we would have predicted in-
vestment in information by the players as the owners dragged their 
feet through the decade of the 2000s.  We can only speculate here; 
perhaps the players were incorporating the growing evidence and rec-
ognized that things just take time.  Alternatively, since the evidence 
was finally making its way to usefulness, perhaps they saw no addi-
tional value to further investment in information.  Finally, we cannot 
ignore football culture.  Perhaps players were weighing the benefits of 
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a potentially improved concussion environment against the contribu-
tion that big hits make to their future value.  Or, since contracts in the 
NFL are very seldom guaranteed, perhaps players were worried about 
how an improved concussion environment would actually reveal what 
owners might perceive as a performance weakness come contract re-
newal time. 
In addition, there are other actions that some players could take 
in the meantime.  Players understand that their employment value as 
well as their long-run quality of life are both at stake and have every 
incentive to practice their own form of concussion management.  
Quite simply, players can “play smarter” regarding concussion on both 
sides of the ball.  They could purposefully choose not to put them-
selves into concussion-producing situations to the best of their ability.  
A quarterback or wide receiver about to take a serious hit knows that 
out of bounds is their best friend.  At this writing, sports writers were 
heaping criticism at Washington Redskins quarterback Robert Griffin 
III for attempting to gain just a couple of extra yards rather than go-
ing out of bounds and receiving a mild concussion as his reward.  In 
addition, quarterbacks and wide receivers can take the slide route. 
Also, as the old saying goes, the proof is in the eating of the pud-
ding, and it just does not look like these changes have yet generated 
any noticeable improvement in coarsely measured injury.  We preface 
with our caution that there is no consistent reporting source for injury 
in the NFL and that most official injury lists, like the league’s Injured 
Reserve (IR) list, are actually subject to strategic choice by General 
Managers and coaches.  Of course, we also know that reports are re-
ports and, as just noted above, repression of especially neurological 
and psychological reports by players is to be expected. 
All that said, we summarize the following results from the well-
known Edgeworth Economics studies of NFL injury.41  From NFLPA 
data, disability claims increase steadily from 1975 through 2007, but 
jump dramatically in 2008 and 2009.  There was also a marked jump in 
the number of players placed on IR from 2007 to 2009.  Of the total 
2,423 claims, 91% were orthopedic, 2% were neurological, and less 
than 1% were psychological.  From other data collected for the report, 
of the 16,552 injuries reported from 2004-2009, 57% involved the 
lower body and 10% involved the category “head/neck/spine.”  Special 
teams have the highest injury incidence, quarterbacks the lowest, and 
other positions suffer pretty much equally.  However, the incidence of 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Edgeworth Economics, Dangers of The game:  Injuries in the NFL, Analysis for The 
NFLPA (2010), available at http://www.esquire.com/cm/esquire/data/Dangers-of-the-Game-
Draft-Esquire.pdf; Edgeworth Economics, Dangers of the Game:  NFL Injury Report (2011), 
available at http://www.esquire.com/cm/esquire/data/Dangers-of-the-Game-Report-Esquire.pdf. 
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concussion is nearly equal between quarterbacks and special teams 
when the category is refined to mild TBI.  It also is the case, from the 
charted data in the reports, that the number of players suffering at 
least one concussion jumped after 2007.  Prior, it was about 2%, in-
creasing from 2.5% in 2007 to almost 6% by 2010.  The later update 
showed an increase in mild TBI from between 150-200 in 2004 to over 
250 by 2010 and 2011.  Mild TBI during kickoffs was at its lowest in 
2011.  Interestingly, while the percentage of players suffering a season-
long injury was highest in 2010, there is no discernable pattern over 
the entire time period, 2002-2010 (the average is about 3.5 percent). 
These rather discouraging data raise the possibility that, ulti-
mately, the player response could be whether or not, and for how long, 
they participate.  The Sporting News surveyed 125 players for a five-
part concussion report.42  Only nine, including two hall of fame mem-
bers, answered “no” to the following question:  “Knowing what you 
know now, would [you] play in the NFL again?”43  However, of the 
ninety-six (77%) that answered “yes”, fifteen had caveats including 
that they would reconsider the length of their stay in the NFL, alter 
how they would hit, and pay attention to doctors rather than hiding 
from and ignoring them.44 
These are quite startling admissions given the culture of football 
values “playing hurt” and “shaking it off” for the good of the team.  
Both prove anathema to concussions/management best practices in 
the previous section.  Players are so physically gifted that high-impact 
contact is guaranteed, as are the rates of concussion that follow.  In 
addition, the fierce loyalty to teammates and coaches toughens this 
nut that must be cracked.  There is clearly a cultural dimension with 
which the concussion policy community must deal. 
B. Barriers to Sincere Bargaining 
How close do the contracts struck between owners and players 
come to including what economists call a “compensating differential” 
to cover the presence of physical risk in the workplace?  If the talent 
market performs well on this dimension, then the risk costs would be 
worked completely into salary and benefits packages.  Clearly this did 
not happen in the past.  Despite the fact that there has been a retire-
ment and disability plan in place since 1959, redress of previous physi-
                                                                                                                           
 42 SN Concussion Report: Five-part Series Overview, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-08-20/nfl-concussion-report-series-statistics-study-
brain-trauma-retired-players. 
 43 Id.  
 44 See id.  
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cal incapacitation was a bone of contention between retired players 
and the NFL years before attention turned to the long-term effects of 
concussions.  The focal point has always been the retirement and dis-
ability package for past players, and there is good reason to believe 
that it is not large enough for current and future players either.  For 
example, only recently has the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(CBA) contained the “88 Benefits” section (dementia, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis or Lou Gehrig’s disease, and Parkinson’s), a long-term 
care section, and a neuro-cognitive benefits section. 
In addition, after its establishment in 1959, the retirement and 
benefits program was owner-controlled until after the great NFL labor 
rift of 1993-94.  A joint player/owner board with an independent direc-
tor was a long time coming.  The board manages the retirement and 
benefits fund.  However, the fund is paid for by owner contributions to 
the level required to cover the bargained benefits. 
Just why it should be expected that the benefits package be un-
derfunded is a complicated mix of factors that all return to the fact 
that owners and players interact with each other through collective 
bargaining.45  That same body of law governs how players must behave 
toward each other when acting collectively through their chosen col-
lective bargaining agent.  Thus law, not economic competition, binds 
players and owners under the rules of collective bargaining and a host 
of complications arise from this fact. 
First, there is the issue of strategic information dissemination be-
cause information is not cost free.  The player strategy is to portray the 
problem as more expensive than it really is; they receive compensa-
tion without facing any actual higher risk.  The owner strategy is to 
portray the problem as less expensive than it really is; they reduce the 
compensation to players and keep the rest.  Owners would find it in 
their best interest to know about the playing consequences of concus-
sions.  If the consequences are long-term, so that they happen by-and-
large after a player’s career is over, then one can see an incentive to 
withhold the information from general consumption. 
On top of the incentive to obtain and hold on to asymmetric in-
formation advantages, we need to add the additional bargaining issues 
that are the grist of the collective bargaining mill.  Even though both 
sides might genuinely wish to convey all of their information about 
workplace safety issues like concussions, there is inherent disbelief 
built into the bargaining process since each knows that the other side 
has a bargaining incentive to misrepresent their side. 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935); Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-188 (1947). 
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With the threat of work stoppage by either side, based on other 
elements on the table, safety might be bargained away for something 
else of importance.  Risk becomes a bargaining chip when costs of 
information are such that there is asymmetric information between 
owners and players.  This may result from nothing more sinister than 
the cruel whims of general economic situation (recessions, for exam-
ple, or how the industry fares at some collective bargaining juncture).  
However, at any collective bargaining juncture, the relative positions 
of owners and players may actually make some elements on the table 
more highly prized than safety. 
C. Enforcement Limitations  
Enforcement complications happen because of the nature of joint 
production and because of the nature of what happens after agree-
ments are struck.  The first complication arises from the truly fascinat-
ing “peculiar economics” of sports for pay.46  Sports are a “joint pro-
duction” activity where opponents and economic competitors are all 
required to make play happen.  Thus, the very definition of NFL foot-
ball requires cooperation among franchise owners in order to brand 
and identify this version of football relative to others, e.g., college 
football.  In addition, acting together as their league, franchise owners 
also engage in a variety of other agreements that enhance the value of 
their league production.  The best example is granting the league the 
ability to negotiate part or all of the value of broadcast/broadband 
contracts. 
It is quite well known that individually owners may be better off 
breaking agreements with each other.  Thus, leagues have a multitude 
of enforcement issues.  Leagues have to make sure that owners play 
the schedule that defines their version of NFL football and also that 
players and managers follow the rules on the field.  Owners have to 
make sure that their fellows obey the business rules and agreements 
as well.  One famous example is NFL owners having to monitor each 
other so they do not violate the league payroll cap. 
Turning directly to workplace safety, if star players on one team 
are hurt, then there is a reduction in quality of play in all games where 
those stars play at reduced capacity.  This is detrimental to fan enjoy-
ment and reduces the value of games to all team owners.  Thus, there 
is an externality on all owners and players if players on one team vio-
late the safety rules while the rest of the players do not.  There are 
various reasons why players would do this, from coaching imperatives 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the 
Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market Competition, 78 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1964). 
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to their own desire to show the owner of their own team their value 
on the field, and it will require league-level decisions; unilateral deci-
sions will put any given owner at a disadvantage so do not expect any 
individual team leadership here. 
As with performance enhancing drugs, where there is a clear pol-
icy, enforcement will eventually become the issue.  Information dis-
semination will have to be enforced.  The rules on the field will have 
to be enforced.  The rules on best practices will have to be enforced.  
Finally, benefit package financing will have to be monitored as there 
have been past episodes where owners have not lived up to their plan 
contribution requirements. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
First and fundamentally, there is a world of understanding about 
the occurrence, incidence, and immediate and long-term impacts of 
concussions.  There are also best practices to be considered.  This is the 
essential information needed by the concussion policy community, and 
disseminating advances is job one.  Right now, that knowledge is less 
impactful than it could be.  Best practices have only recently begun to 
be applied in the NFL, but there are encouraging signs in state law.  
However, in addition to protecting quarterbacks and wide receivers, 
an unscientific extrapolation of the college football incidence data to 
the NFL, by position, suggests that linebackers and offensive linemen 
are in need of more protection as well.  Their play-by-play contains 
the less observable “sub-concussive” impact problem detailed in Sec-
tion II.  A focus away from unconsciousness, admittedly gut wrench-
ing, toward sub-concussive impact is long overdue. 
The NFL’s past barriers to information dissemination also have a 
lesson for the concussion policy community.  While there are potent 
economic forces at work, in specific situations there may need to be 
some way to make information dissemination happen that is inde-
pendent of owners and players.  While the NFL’s response is economi-
cally predictable, so is a prediction that owners may return to their 
previous treatment of concussions/management information should 
the economic margins governing information dissemination so dictate.  
In addition, just why is it that players were not also entering into the 
information dissemination fray needs investigating.  Finally, eventually, 
if there is no change in injury rates, especially concussion occurrences, 
something has surely gone awry in terms of turning information into 
action. 
Anything that can smooth the bargaining process so that the 
wishes of owners and players actually make it to the table and are 
bargained sincerely, rather than strategically, will put concus-
sions/management more in line with what is best for both sides.  The 
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result will be rules on the field, concussion management on the field, 
and compensation and long-term benefits packages that overcome the 
tension between injury and profit inherent in play-for-pay sports. 
We suspect that this will require time to develop.  Lest we forget, 
player safety and financial issues including retirement and disability 
pay have always been an important part of negotiations and will be-
come even more so over time.  So, it remains possible that collective 
bargaining will get the job done.  If not, the NLRB and the courts un-
der appeal must understand this relationship between bargaining limi-
tation and concussions/management.  Of course, the particular issue of 
workplace safety might be taken out of collective bargaining alto-
gether by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).  However, to date, there has been no pressure by elected 
officials on OSHA’s “hands off” approach to pro sports league work-
place safety.  To date, the NFL has only drawn OSHA scrutiny in the 
case of death during training. 
Finally, and in our opinion possibly the thorniest issue, is en-
forcement.  In a version of the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma, there is 
value to owners who cheat both in the form of play they encourage on 
their team and in terms of eventual payment of compensation.  There 
is also value to players who cheat because winning still involves inca-
pacitation of opposing players.  Unless suitable enforcement is also 
imposed, then the rules and compensation approach may be undone 
by the pursuit of individual welfare to the detriment of the overall 
good of both owners and players.  The current system of oversight by 
the Commissioner’s office is a “fox and henhouse” issue since the 
Commissioner serves at the discretion of owners. 
In closing, we offer a caution.  It is easy to demonize the concus-
sions and the games that cause them rather than the mismanagement 
of brain injury itself.  Anyone can get a concussion, but it is more 
likely to occur during participation in contact sports.  If sports are to 
continue, it is not just about reducing contact.  It might be more about 
how the resulting injury is handled.  Relative to best practices, in many 
documented instances, additional contact is not precluded and nobody 
intervenes to make the athlete take the prescribed period of rest after 
contact. 
In addition, remember, the lawsuits pending against the NFL are 
not about the risk of injury.  They are about whether or not the NFL 
withheld their knowledge of that risk.  In a sense, it is not really a con-
cussion issue per se but a question about liability.  It is easier to de-
monize the concussion and the game that causes it than to condemn 
how some people handled the problem in the past. 
Ultimately, concussions/management is a source of business man-
agement conflict.  The fans simply love the game, violence and all.  
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And as the revenue that players generate has risen to millions more 
than they are paid, owners have worked to retard violence compared 
to the level of just ten years ago.  But it cannot be forgotten that own-
ers are conflicted.  They want to preserve their very valuable talent, 
but they also want to give the fans what they are willing to pay the 
most to see.  With player quality of life in the balance, and with all of 
the other impediments to information dissemination, bargaining, and 
monitoring, that conflict can be expected to lead to an unacceptably 
high level of safety risk.  The level of safety that maximizes the value 
of talent is not necessarily the level that is best for the long-term 
health of players unless the full cost of concussions/management is 
accounted for. 
 
